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Decision-Making Authority in British Supermarket Chains  
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the authority of store managers for the stocking and merchandising of British 
supermarkets in the period between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. Using oral history and business 
archive data, the paper assesses the case of two broadly similar retail chains. It identifies variations 
between the firms in relation to the extent of centralised versus decentralised control at the start of the 
study period. It then shows how the firms came to operate an essentially similar approach by its 
conclusion. Explanations for the changes identified are drawn from an assessment of the retail 
environment, and differences between the firms in terms of corporate culture.   
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1.0 Introduction  
This paper considers management decision-making authority in British supermarket chains. It 
analyses the decision-making authority of store managers for the stocking and merchandising of 
‘their’ store, and in relation to Head Office and regional-level management. This places the empirical 
focus of the paper at the intersection between marketing and operations. The paper presents a 
conceptual discussion which provides the basis for consideration of two retailer case studies. Among 
the questions explored are: what approaches to the control of management decision-making authority 
were employed by retailers operating supermarket chains during the period between the mid-1960s 
and the mid-1980s; how did these approaches influence the firm’s resource deployment and capability 
development; and how and why did approaches differ between firms and over time? Such questions 
are highly pertinent both to the study of business history and to contemporary business and 
management studies.  
Historical analysis of the supermarket format in post Second World War Britain has provided 
surprisingly few studies concerned with issues of management control.1 Instead most emphasis has 
been placed upon spatial and structural aspects of the emergence of self-service and supermarket 
retailing practices, and the role the supermarket format in changing consumer cultures. 2  Nonetheless, 
the contemporary trade press on occasion pointed to the significance of a better understanding of 
approaches to management decision-making at the store level, with studies uncovering significant 
variations in practice in retail chains across Europe.3 Writing on the challenges of supermarket 
management in the mid-1960s, one commentator explained the uncertain public image of the 
supermarket chain Fine Fare in relation to the issue of management control:  
“Individual store managers were given considerable discretion in coping with the problem of sales 
falling below target (the result of over-rapid, enthusiastic expansion of sites). A welter of free offers, 
attempts to trade up the scale, over-deep price cuts and other variations left the public with no clear 
idea of what Fine Fare really represented as a whole or store by store - a severe handicap for any store 
group.”4  
Writing in the mid-1980s, Dawson observed that “many companies still give the appearance of feeling 
their way in terms of management style.” 5 Subsequently retail management scholars have 
characterised the 1980s and 1990s as decades during which British grocery retailing witnessed a 
general trend of the “reduction of store-level decision-making in favour of corporate control at the 
centre.”6 This process was aided by the roll-out of scanning and other computerised systems across 
British grocery multiples’ store estates.7 But this raises questions about the situation during the 
preceding decades during which the supermarket became an established format in the British retail 
environment.  
Consequently, this paper aims to build upon our existing knowledge of the issue in three main ways. 
First it provides a more thorough introduction to the debate of management control of supermarket 
retailing in post-war Britain than is typical of much of the recent business history research. Secondly, 
retrospective analysis has established the general chronology of patterns of change in management 
decision-making control. The empirical evidence presented in this paper is organised in an effort to 
show the potential for historical research to uncover more of the granularity of the transformations 
occurring. Related to this it seeks to illustrate the potential of focusing on moments of decision 
making rather than outcomes; which leads us to think about alternatives, and about how what were to 
become outcomes were subject to contest and challenge.8 This is highlighted in this study through a 
direct comparison of the two retailer cases. Thirdly, it presents a framework for further study that is 
focused on two areas that in combination offer powerful explanations for the trends identified: the 
influence of the changing market environment, and that of corporate culture and hence also agency 
within the firm.  
As such the study seeks to contribute to the wider understanding of the history of retailing during the 
study period. Whilst supermarket numbers grew rapidly during the 1960s and initiatives were 
launched to share knowledge on operating the new format,9 the fundamental nature of the change to 
retailing and shopping practices heralded by the supermarket ensured that it would be more than a 
decade before a revised ‘macro-culture’ emerged in the sector.10 The adoption of a firm-level 
assessment of approaches to management decision-making control is thus considered particularly 
relevant. More generally, the study also seeks to contribute to the debate on the relationships between 
strategy, structure and the organisation of management decision-making, and their effects on 
organisational performance.   
 The remainder of the paper is divided into five parts. The first provides a review of some of the 
multi-disciplinary literature that contributes to the development of the conceptualisation underpinning 
the analysis of decision-making authority in retail chains in this study. Informed by the literature 
review, the next part presents the conceptual framework, and evaluates the relationship between 
decision-making structures and processes and the firm’s resource deployment and capability 
development. Following a discussion of the methods underpinning the empirical research, the third 
part provides an assessment of the organisation of management decision-making in two British 
supermarket firms J. Sainsbury and Tesco.11 These two businesses had among the highest grocery 
market shares throughout the period under consideration. This is followed by a discussion of the 
importance of incorporating consideration of both the external market environment and internal firm-
specific factors in explaining the approaches to the control of management decision-making authority 
identified. The final part of the paper draws together the conclusions of the study. It explains the 
contribution of the research to our understanding of retail change during the study period. More 
generally it assesses the relevance of the approach taken to studies of the contemporary retail industry.   
 
2.0 Related Research: Understanding Decision-Making Control in Retail Chains 
The focus of this paper is on the decision-making authority of the store managers of Britain’s 
emerging supermarket chains for stocking and merchandising of the store. The debate on 
centralisation versus decentralisation is of considerable relevance here,12 including as it relates to the 
coordination of multi-unit firms – chains, or multiples, in the lexicon of retail management – trading 
across heterogeneous geographical markets.13 With regard to retailing, it is suggested that 
decentralised firms perform better when markets are localised and heterogeneous, and centralised 
firms when markets are wider and more homogenous.14 The degree of heterogeneity or homogeneity 
of markets reflects specific demand and supply conditions. On the demand side these include 
consumers’ sensitivity to store outputs (including price, assortment, and service). Low sensitivity to 
deviations of local stores from the standards held by consumers reinforces localised shopping 
behaviours. An increase in sensitivity leads consumers to shop around, broadens the market and 
enhances the tendency toward homogeneity. On the supply side an increase in competitive intensity in 
the distribution channel accelerates the rate of innovation and leads to improvements in outputs. In 
turn, this enhances consumers’ search across stores and markets, further increasing market 
homogeneity.15  
Whilst clearly differing in context to this study of British supermarket retailing, historical analyses of 
US department store retailing reveal the significance to chain retailers of choices made regarding the 
adoption of centralised and decentralised management decision making approaches. Moreover they 
highlight the contribution of different types of knowledge, both tacit and explicit, to retailer decision-
making and the role of information technologies in mediating their influence; themes that are also 
shown to be of importance in this analysis of post-war supermarket retailing in Britain. In developing 
his thesis on the linkages between strategy and organisational form, Chandler examined the evolving 
decentralisation of the Sears, Roebuck and Company business following the entry into store based 
retailing in 1925. 16  At the culmination of Chandler’s study, in the early post-war years, whilst buying 
remained centralised, executives in territorial offices had responsibility for a variety of operations 
including inventory and sales. As Raff and Temin observe of the situation in the business during the 
interwar years, “Store managers, and a territorial organization that grew up over them, purchased from 
the buyers the goods that were sold in the local stores… [E]ach local store manager to a considerable 
extent autonomous within the four walls of his own store. The buyers therefore had to do far more 
than simply procure goods on favorable terms. They had to persuade the store managers to stock 
them.”17 What this approach to stock control revealed was the significance for Sears’ store-based 
operations of local and regional variations in demand for goods and services. It stood in contrast to the 
situation in mail order retailing, Sears’ origins as a retail business, in which buyers were in effect 
sourcing for a national market and in which regional variations and anomalies of demand could be 
more readily smoothed.18 Many US department store chains displayed an even more decentralised 
structure, with buying and merchandising orchestrated at regional and even local store level.19  
Poor performance during the 1970s, in large part the result of competition from discount department 
stores and focused specialty stores, would refocus attention at Sears on the issues of organisational 
structure and management control.20 In contrast to Sears, these newer competitors typically operated 
centralised buying procedures and used new information technologies more intensively in an attempt 
to control the supply chain and enhance performance. Debate ensued between two groups in Sear’s 
management which held differing views of the nature of the competitive challenge, and how best to 
respond to it. In essence, one group advocated taking away store managers' decision-making authority 
on matters of stock and inventory control, whilst the other sought to retain much of their 
independence through decentralised control.21 The latter group won the argument, and this decision 
would subsequently be identified as part of wider problems in the firm’s retailing operations that put 
the survival of the firm in jeopardy.22     
The importance of local, often tacit, knowledge for effective decision-making in stocking and 
merchandising the store provides some explanation for the tendency among retail chains for 
decentralisation of decision-making authority. As Wood observes on US department store retailing, 
“… there was an emphasis on tacit/local market knowledge, above any centralising tendency, as 
markets were regarded as complex, ‘each one differing from the other and for that matter having 
differences between themselves…’”, “…the geography of US department store retailing had become a 
highly decentralised activity. Merchants were locally embedded within their core markets, knew them 
well, and performed ably.”23 Subsequently new technological systems have promoted enhanced 
centralisation in US department store retailing, a trend also evident across other retail formats and in 
other retail markets, with the potential for enhanced economies of scale and scope as a result.24  
However, this is not to suggest that local market information has become entirely unimportant, 
particularly in conditions of heterogeneity in demand and supply. 25  For example, Raff, in a study of 
superstore business models in book retailing, reveals how sophisticated centralised inventory control 
could be augmented by soliciting information from store-level staff.26 As Amin and Cohendet suggest, 
it is important to be able to integrate fragments of localised learning in the management of core 
competencies in business networks.27 Retail firms need to continue to find the right balance between 
centralising systems and control and local input to decision-making in today’s market, much as they 
did in previous periods.   
In considering the capacity for organisational learning among chains, it has been posited that “chains 
emphasize replicating and coordinating a standard set of routines or capabilities in multiple 
locations”, and that “through transfer learning among components, multiunit chains not only replicate 
but also improve their routines, resulting in learning curves within each component and spillover 
learning among them.”28 Yet, studies of the ability of chains to respond to local market variations 
suggest differences between them in this regard based upon governance. In a comparison of company-
owned and franchise operations in US restaurant chains, for example, Yin and Zajac observe that “for 
company-owned stores, chains are typically involved in both tactical and strategic decisions”, and that 
consequently “with few decision rights in the hands of company store managers, local adaptation for 
company-owned arrangements is a rather coarse-grained approach, targeting the whole local market 
rather than individual stores. … Company store managers are supposed to operate stores by 
maintaining standards rather than responding to local markets conditions.” 29 Thus, consideration 
needs to be given the manner in which issues of governance and authority permeate and inform those 
of strategy-structure fit. 30   
 
3.0 Conceptualising Decision-Making Control in British Supermarket Chains  
The concern here is to conceptualise management decision-making authority in company-owned 
supermarket chains with regard to stock control and merchandising at the individual store level. Such 
chains are distinct from cooperatives, retail voluntary group chains and franchise chain arrangements 
that themselves display variations in terms of inter-firm strategic integration.31 In basic terms, and 
following the existing literature, it is possible to distinguish between the adoption of a centralised or a 
decentralised organisational design.32 In a fully centralised organisational design all relevant decision-
making authority rests with the “Head Office”, whilst in a fully decentralised organisational design it 
rests with the management of the individual retail outlet. A fully centralised decision-making structure 
is compatible with the ‘retail philosophy’ that the performance of the chain is determined by the 
ability to implement chain-wide capabilities that lead to economies of scale and scope. A fully 
decentralised organisational structure is compatible with the ‘retail philosophy’ that the performance 
of a chain is determined by how successful each individual store is in its local market area.       
However, as Teece observes, “centralizing and decentralizing are not genuine alternatives for 
organization; the key issue is to decide the mix”.33 Moreover, in relation to decentralisation it is 
important to recognise the potential for considerable variation in the extent of autonomy granted 
depending on the decision making area in question. Hence there is a continuum of decentralisation 
between ‘Full and Complete’ and ‘Partial and Limited’ decentralisation. In ‘Full and Complete’ 
decentralisation the chains’ performance is considered to be determined by how successfully each 
store is trading in its local area. Store-level resources and capabilities are seen as the basis of success. 
Any investments in chain-level institutions and capabilities are made with the intent of providing 
support to stores in their particular market environments. 
 In the case of ‘Partial and Limited’ decentralisation, chain-level capabilities, which can generate 
economies of scale and scope, are considered to be more important in determining both the firm’s 
overall competitive position and how well each of its stores performs. The company invests its 
resources in building chain-level institutions and capabilities. Firms invest in co-ordination systems 
designed to closely integrate the network of stores, so as to ensure effective implementation of chain-
wide strategies.  
Conceiving of the extent of decentralisation as points along a continuum that vary depending on the 
decision-making area under consideration is important in relation to the empirical focus of this study; 
decision-making relating to the stocking and merchandising of the supermarket. Opportunities for 
economies of scale and scope in retailing can vary between product and service categories as a result 
of fragmentation in local supply and demand conditions. Hence, store managers might simultaneously 
exercise variable decision autonomy across categories.  
 
Firms positioned at the opposing ends of the decentralisation continuum will develop distinct and 
specialised capabilities, which evolve along increasingly divergent development trajectories as the 
chains expand. Chains that pursue ‘Full and Complete’ decentralisation across most decision-making 
areas display strong sets of capabilities accumulated at the individual store-level, but far weaker 
capabilities at the chain level. Individual store managers accumulate strong resources and develop 
capabilities reflecting local market opportunities and challenges. But, in cases of perceived market 
heterogeneity in terms of local demand and supply conditions, there is limited benefit in being able to 
transfer these capabilities across the firm, and thus the individual store component of the firm’s set of 
capabilities and resources remains tacit and diffuse.34 In contrast, firms adopting a more centralised 
approach to decision-making across most decision-making areas, i.e. those closer to the ‘Partial and 
Limited’ end of the decentralisation continuum, display strong capabilities accumulated at the chain-
level, but usually weaker capabilities at the level of the individual store. In conditions of market 
heterogeneity, the focus upon chain-level disciplines necessitates that the expanding firms develop a 
more complex body of capabilities, systems and repertoires designed to realise economies of chain 
retailing despite localised demand and supply conditions. This discussion leads us to expect that in 
conditions of market heterogeneity chains that are expanding following a ‘Full and Complete’ 
decentralisation display a comparatively flat capabilities’ trajectory over time whilst the trajectory of 
those pursuing a more centralised approach is steeper.35 Hence these two trajectories become 
increasingly divergent. The expected pattern is shown in Figure 1.    
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
4. Decision-Making Control in British Supermarket Retailing  
This section of the paper provides an overview of the methodology underpinning the empirical study, 
and then presents the findings of two case studies that illustrate the approaches to management 
decision-making at J. Sainsbury and Tesco in the period between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. 
The cases are of interest as they allow for comparison of two firms operating with essentially similar 
retail business models and that were vying for market share supremacy in the grocery trade 
throughout much of the period under consideration. It is not suggested that the cases as presented 
below provide a complete account of all changes occurring in management decision-making authority 
and control at these firms during the study period.   
An extensive reading of the trade press and of available corporate histories provides useful contextual 
information for the study. Corporate histories of retailers represent the richer source in relation to 
matters of management decision-making authority and control. The tendency of some such histories 
to focus upon the founder and their families can be informative given retailing is one sector in which 
founder families maintained an influential role.36 However, such histories vary considerably in their 
rigour and as such require particularly careful assessment.37 A well-used source in much historical 
retail research, the trade press provides significant insight into patterns of change in the grocery 
sector.38 However, the review of sources informing this paper and the wider study from which it is 
drawn suggests detailed discussion of the styles and processes of chain management to be scarcer. 
Given the limitations of published documentary sources, a number of business-related oral histories 
relating to the retailers, J. Sainsbury and Tesco, have also been analysed to supplement the available 
data. These have been accessed from existing collections and were selected due to their focus on the 
issues of store management. In relation to Tesco, the ‘Tesco: An Oral History’ collection gathered as 
part of the British Library’s National Life Stories oral-history project has been used. Contributors to 
this collection were selected by National Life Stories, an independent charitable trust within the 
British Library, in association with Tesco, and the approach is described as one of life stories, with 
special emphasis on working life.39 In the case of J. Sainsbury, oral histories available in the firm’s 
archive collection have been accessed. The archive holds oral history interviews from employees at 
different levels of the organisation and includes those commissioned to support published histories of 
the firm, as well as others that the archive papers suggest were provided proactively by interviewees 
upon their retirement.40  The research for this paper is underpinned by direct analysis of some 20 oral 
histories in total. Such data provides an important supplement to documentary sources, and one that 
can be particularly appropriate in probing undocumented, unsolicited or unauthorised activity within 
the business organisation.41 Nonetheless, use of oral histories in this particular context raises a number 
of important methodological issues. These include concern over possible corporate interference in 
commissioned projects, although Perks (2010) suggests that ‘the consensus amongst business 
historians is that most commissioned projects are allowed free rein, at research stage if not at 
publication stage…’42 No publication restrictions were imposed on the oral history data used in this 
project. Also, an additional set of interviews was undertaken directly by the author with former retail 
managers and directors from the two companies to both confirm and contextualise information and 
data drawn from the other sources.43 Moreover care was taken to consider a number of interviews that 
reflect the views of managers who worked at different levels within the two companies in the post-
war decades, from store manager to Chairman, and to consider contributions from individuals who 
worked at a number of managerial levels within the organisation and thus perhaps held a wider 
perspective.  The study is further underpinned by an extensive analysis of relevant documents in the J. 
Sainsbury archive.  
 
4.1 J. Sainsbury: Adapting Centralised Management Control 
J. Sainsbury maintained a highly centralised control of management decision-making as it developed 
its supermarket operations during the early post-war decades. This reflected the structure and 
processes that had been developed since the firm’s inception and that had been reinforced by the 
essentially organic nature of the chain’s growth. As Emerson observes of the business up to 1939, 
control from the headquarters was ‘fastidiously and constantly applied…’44 A review of the company 
and its operations published in Management Today in 1967, and republished in full in the July issue of 
JS Journal that year, described the extent and nature of the continued centralisation of decision-
making.45 It explained that all buying decisions came from Head Office, and also decisions on which 
lines were to be carried by each shop, and those on promotion. Prices were also decided centrally, it 
was reported.  
Computerisation of the stock ordering function at Head Office began in 1961 with the installation of 
an EMIDEC 1100 computer which replaced the mechanised Powers-Samas punched card system that 
had been in use for centrally managed stock control of non-perishable items. Continued investment in 
computerisation was vital in enabling the company to maintain its highly centralised control of the 
increased volume and widening variety of goods being sold through the retailer’s expanding network 
of larger self-service stores and supermarkets. This was particularly so as the stores were 
progressively supplied by a number of new regional distribution centres designed to relieve the 
pressure on the outdated and congested Blackfriars depot in London.46 It was reported that some 
seventy per cent of goods were supplied through the company’s own depots during the early years of 
the 1970s.47  Sainsbury’s own brand lines were extended considerably during the 1960s, and it has 
been estimated that they accounted for over 50 per cent of the firm’s turnover by the end of that 
decade.48 One consequence of this high proportion of own label sales was that it further heightened 
the importance of the centralised management functions, not only in buying and design but also in 
distribution, and of the need for strict disciplines at store level, including in merchandising.49  
Store managers’ scope for individualised decision-making thus remained restricted. Managers were 
instructed that any store-level alterations to the stock orders calculated by the central systems were 
permissible only in exceptional circumstances, and with prior agreement.50 
The Vice-Chairman John Sainsbury provided one explanation for the continuation of centralisation of 
management decision-making authority; “Of course, he [the store manager] is of a higher calibre, but 
he needs to be just to run the store. In fact they prefer to have all those worries taken off their 
shoulders so that they can get on with their proper job.”51 However, a subsequent company history 
suggests the approach to management decision-making control also reflected weaknesses among some 
of the cadre of existing store managers, who were well trained to execute instructions but less well-
equipped to manage the new supermarkets. 52 
Changes to decision-making control structures and processes were made during the 1970s to account 
for the continued growth of supermarket operations, and the increasingly competitive market 
environment in supermarket retailing.53 Decision-making control remained largely centralised, but 
some enhanced responsibility was given to store managers to undertake locally-based management 
decision-making on retail marketing matters, as well as in other areas including particularly managing 
store personnel.54 There was a heightened expectation that managers would display awareness of their 
local competition, and feed this information back to the district and area management teams. Store 
managers remained restricted to the stocking list for their branch, but could request permission 
through their district manager to modify their allocation of lines and promotions in response to market 
trends and competitor activity. Such local information was deemed especially useful as the chain 
expanded beyond South East England and the English Midlands into new markets in the North of 
England.55  
The adoption of new store-based information technology impacted upon the parameters of store 
managers’ decision-making role at this time. At J. Sainsbury the Store Labour Inventory Management 
(SLIM) system, a portable computerised store-based ordering system, had been rolled out to 79 
branches by 1972, and across the store estate within the following two years.56 This new system of 
supply and stock control was developed and trialled by the American consultant Ned Harwell, who J. 
Sainsbury appointed to provide advice on new methods of technology enabled stock control and 
merchandising.57 At the Sainsbury’s Retail Managers Conference of 1974 store managers were 
informed of the greater responsibility they bore for the stock ordering process as a result of the 
installation of the SLIM system.58 SLIM replaced some of the personal correspondence between 
clerks in the buying office and store managers, and required enhanced disciplines from store managers 
to ensure the placing of accurate orders.59  
The merchandising of stock within the store was managed in a heavily centralised manner during the 
immediate post-war decades, particularly with regard to window displays.60 However, during the 
latter years of the 1970s enhanced responsibility was given to store managers on matters of store 
merchandising, albeit within the constraints of centrally issued guidance including store display 
reports. An article in the company’s in-house magazine reporting Sainsbury’s Retail Managers 
Conference of 1978 explained the situation thus: “For some time this crucial function was controlled 
by the centre with the result that managers were almost discouraged from playing a part in this 
activity. JS now plans to provide managers with the aids necessary for controlling their own display 
work, with the central function being one of determining policy, new techniques and the provision of 
information. This highlights a new relationship between the centre and the store manager.”61 As one 
contributor to the J. Sainsbury oral history collection explained of his time as a store manager in the 
1970s:  
“Oh we had layout. We had layouts so you had to have the goods laid out in a set sequence, but how 
much shelf space you gave to each item was determined locally by your store display report. So if you 
sold a lot of Line “Y” you could have more of line “Y” on display. And that was down to you as a 
manager.” 62 
Delegates at the company’s retail managers’ conferences were reminded that the added responsibility 
given to store managers did not translate into complete autonomy: “JS managers are being asked to 
accept more responsibility within carefully defined and understood limits... Responsibility means 
authority. It means the manager is in charge to a greater extent than ever before. It also means 
accountability. Just as there is more scope, so there are more chances to foul things up. One way a 
manager can avoid mistakes is to know where authority ends. When he has a problem, he should work 
out whether it is something that he can deal with or whether it comes within the district manager’s 
sphere, and if it does call him.” 63 
The existing administrative structure that grouped branches into areas and districts was retained and 
extended, and enhanced authority was given to area and district managers for the assessment and 
control of the branches. This approach was intended to eliminate what had been described as an 
otherwise potentially ‘dangerous gap’ between centre and branch.64  Store managers were expected to 
be accountable to their District Manager, with the latter reporting to the Area General Manager.65 A 
Directors’ Branch Committee was established with the purpose, among other things, to monitor and 
support aspects of the decentralisation of control, and to make enhanced branch level performance 
data available to Area General Managers. 66 
 The activities of district managers and their Area General Managers were themselves prescribed by 
the centre. Consequently there was only limited variation between regions in terms of stores’ 
operating practices. Area managers were called to a monthly meeting, sometimes attended by the 
Chairman, at which company views and policies were articulated, and at which the senior 
management could develop an impression of matters occurring at the store level.  As David Clapham, 
who had been promoted to an Area Manager during the 1980s, recalled: 
“And then over lunch you would sit with the Chairman there…and he would ask you how things … 
were going…. But also about initiatives that we were taking…. So for an hour once a month he got 
himself up to date with what the AGMs were thinking. … And then we would take away messages 
from him that we could then use to inspire Managers. Clever set-up.” 67  
In summary, as the chain of supermarkets grew during the 1970s and early 1980s store managers and 
regional and area managers took on elements of enhanced responsibility for aspects of stock ordering 
and merchandising at the individual store-level. Nonetheless the extent of decentralisation of 
management decision-making authority with regard to stocking and merchandising the store was very 
much toward the “Partial and Limited” end of the decentralisation continuum. J. Sainsbury’s approach 
to management control of decision-making related to these activities remained very largely a 
centralised one, with instructions relayed through a clear management hierarchy.  
 
4.2 Tesco: Switching to More Centralised Management Control 
At first glance approaches to management control of decision-making at Tesco during the study 
period appear similar to that of J. Sainsbury. Like Sainsbury’s, Tesco invested in the development of 
chain-level capabilities. The central buying team sought economies of scale and scope, providing an 
authorised list of goods that could be stocked in stores, and a price list intended to be implemented 
across the chain.68 Similarly, as the firm’s estate of supermarket and self-service stores expanded so 
Tesco invested in computerisation at its Head Office, first in 1965 and with subsequent upgrades, in 
order to enhance analysis of stock movement, financial planning, and to initiate payment to 
suppliers.69 The firm also operated a hierarchically-organised store inspection regime comprising 
Inspectors, Regional Controllers/Inspectors and Regional Managing Directors.    
However, and in marked contrast to the case of J. Sainsbury, at Tesco control and oversight from the 
centre did not prevent decisions at regional and store management level frequently being at the 
expense of chain-wide efficiencies. Regional management input had a far more significant impact on 
Tesco’s store operations than at J. Sainsbury, with some regional directors operating ‘fiefdoms’ within 
the organisation, as Head Office struggled to exert control and was itself beset by deepening 
boardroom schisms during the latter 1960s and early 1970s.70 This was epitomised by the Tesco chain 
effectively operating as two separate businesses during the second half of the 1960s, with Tesco 
(North) operating in a largely autonomous manner from Tesco (South).  The acquisitive method of 
growth of the Tesco chain was significant in this regard, and stood in sharp contrast to that of J. 
Sainsbury. Tesco acquired a number of retail chains during the 1950s and 1960s that enabled the 
business to promote its store estate and market coverage. However, as well as store estates and 
systems of variable quality each brought the challenge of integrating differing corporate cultures. 
Some acquisitions such as that of Victor Value in 1968, with 217 stores Tesco’s most significant 
acquisition, brought entrenched management problems of their own placing further pressure on 
Tesco’s own inadequate systems.71    
At Tesco store managers retained significant de-facto decision-making authority over elements of 
stocking and merchandising the store, which led to perceptions of inconsistency of store image across 
the chain.72 Managers made up orders from a burgeoning authorised stock list supplied by the buying 
office. This list reflected the predominance of the firm’s buying function over its retail function, with 
stock frequently being pushed through the system regardless of the needs of the store.73 Yet store 
managers also had an “intense” direct relationship with suppliers’ sales representatives who visited 
the stores directly and sought to influence stocking and merchandising decisions.74 Dealing with 
suppliers’ representatives was a significant part of the store managers’ weekly tasks and led to 
considerable amounts of individual deal making.75 If local suppliers’ representatives offered generous 
promotional terms it provided an opportunity to store managers to improve their stock position, a 
critical benchmark for the assessment of store manager performance at Tesco;76 although the 
motivations for local deal making could also be more about personal gain.77 Such local deals could 
negatively impact chain-wide promotional strategies.78 Even the centrally issued price list was not 
immune from store managers’ interventions.79 In Powell’s analysis of this period of the company’s 
history, a study based largely upon the recollections of senior management, one board member 
reflects: “Tesco was still trading with primitive systems at the launch of Check-out [1977]”. Most 
store managers made “their own little decisions, careless of their impact on the company as a whole”, 
and the firm “… had inadequate stock control systems throughout the business. Until Check-out, 
managers really looked after themselves, and pretty well stocked what they liked.”80  
The latitude exercised by store managers in part reflected the organisation of Tesco’s distribution 
function, which saw its own distribution infrastructure account for as little as twenty per cent of the 
goods sold at its stores. As noted above, this contrasted with the case of J. Sainsbury in which some 
seventy per cent of goods were supplied through the company’s own depots during the early years of 
the 1970s, and suppliers’ sales representative usually dealt directly with Head Office buyers, not store 
managers. At Tesco most deliveries were direct to store, both through manufacturers’ sales 
representatives and through supplier-appointed carriers.81 Combined with limited monitoring and 
control systems this provided an opportunity for store manager interventions at the expense of chain-
wide efficiency and marketing discipline.82  
Store managers were also actively engaged with the merchandising of their store. Similar to the 
situation at Sainsbury’s, many store managers were promoted from store-based trades roles and thus 
had considerable on-the-job experience with this aspect of retailing. Managers from the 1970s 
reflected on their ability to dictate much of the look of their stores in the absence of strict enforcement 
of centrally-issued space planning guides.83 
Operation Checkout, launched by Tesco in 1977, witnessed the dropping of trading stamps, which had 
become a main element of the firm’s promotional strategy, and a wide price-cutting campaign to draw 
customer attention. Its aftermath exposed the limitations of the firm’s existing approach to supply 
chain management, and particularly its reliance on direct to store delivery. Such an approach led to de 
facto decentralisation of considerable authority to store and regional management.84 As Smith and 
Sparks explain in their analysis of Tesco’s supply chain management, to begin to realise the change of 
strategy away from ‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ signified by Operation Checkout, ‘modernisers’ among 
Tesco’s senior management considered it vital to centralise control so as to enhance product ranging 
decisions, provide better control for the quality of products entering the stores, and to promote more 
uniform pricing across the chain.85  Consequently the firm began to adopt a more rigorously 
centralised approach to management decision-making control, taking away significant elements of 
regional and store managers’ decision-making authority.  
Dennis Tuffin, Director of Tesco Stores and head of Tesco’s retail operations in the 1980s observed, 
“In effect, Cheshunt [the Head Office] took over the whole operational role of the company and made 
it as simple as it could. It provided our people with clear directions on what to display, what to sell, on 
store layouts, and range rationalisation, everything. Before that it had all been down to store level, but 
after Check-out the centre provided its managers with the service they needed to run their own stores 
properly.”86 A strategy committee was formed and sought to reduce the quantity of lines authorised by 
the buying office and to modify the push approach to stocking of stores. Attempts were made to better 
segment the store estate and to plan what lines stores should carry.87 Suppliers’ representatives no 
longer dealt with individual store managers but instead with Head Office. Further investment in 
information technology supported the strategy to limit the scope for decentralised decision-making, 
with store manager initiated variations to stock orders generated by new computerised order systems 
having to be arranged by agreement with Head Office.88 Additional personnel and systems were 
deployed at Head Office to interpret the data on sales and profitability, an important investment in 
infrastructure not matched by some of Tesco’s competitors.89 Tesco’s senior management from the 
time of Operation Checkout reflect that the enhanced centralisation of decision-making, particularly 
of stock ordering, was welcomed by store managers and enabled them to better look after their 
customers’ needs in store.90 Store managers reflections on the implications of the changes post 
Operation Checkout are perhaps rather more ambivalent, particularly when centralised control 
constrained what they considered legitimate creativity and ‘entrepreneurialism.’ 91 
The company sought to promote how the greater control afforded by enhanced centralised buying and 
distribution could enable a more effective marketing function aimed at providing a consistent national 
offer, yet one adjusted to take account of specific local demands. In 1985 Tesco would proclaim, “All 
Tesco stores are analysed according to their size, layout and location to optimise the product portfolio. 
Shelf space allocation, stock replenishment, product development and productivity are carefully 
controlled providing the basis of an integrated management information system.” 92 
In summary, following Operation Checkout the senior management team at Tesco sought to change 
the means through which localised demand and supply opportunities were met, away from poorly 
integrated decentralised regional and branch level decision-making, sometimes at the expense of 
wider chain level efficiencies, toward one in which such opportunities were realised where possible 
through a more centralised approach to decision-making control.  
 
5. Changing Approaches to Management Decision-Making Control:  Exploring Lines for 
Further Enquiry.    
Changes in retailers’ approaches to management decision-making control are explained by a complex 
mix of inter-related external environmental and internal, firm-specific factors. This penultimate part 
of the paper concentrates upon two different factors to explain the changes identified in relation to the 
case studies; key changes in the competitive environment of grocery retailing during the 1970s, and 
the influence of corporate cultures in shaping retailers’ responses to these changes. It is not the 
purpose here to present an extensive analysis of each, but rather to elaborate upon those factors that 
offer the most productive lines for further enquiry.  
 
5.1 The Changing Retail Grocery Market 
In the 1950s and early 1960s many consumers shopped for food within their local area. However, 
increasing car ownership levels enabled more shoppers to expand the radius of their food shopping 
trips during the ensuing decade, thus increasing their exposure to a wider variety of supermarkets and 
their differing propositions.93 Furthermore, the intensification of supermarket competition and 
inflationary pressures on consumers during the 1970s combined to enhance price sensitivity, and 
supermarkets’ performance was more widely reported in the business press and popular media. Many 
firms reacted by reconceiving retail competition as being national rather than local, and they identified 
themselves as engaging in firm-level (chain) rather than store-level  competition, focusing on the 
development of “market basket” pricing policies.94 They sought to establish a more cohesive chain 
image including through implementing chain-wide marketing and promotional strategies. As such, 
changing demand-side conditions encouraged the adoption of a stronger chain oriented approach to 
decision making, diminishing the effectiveness of full and complete decentralisation of decision-
making authority.  
Transformation in supply chain management practices is also significant to our understanding of the 
increasing adoption of centralised management control of distribution in the grocery sector. Against a 
backdrop of a considerable slowdown in retail sales volume in the first half or so of the 1970s and an 
escalation of the costs of doing business, retailers were also forced to give greater attention to the 
management and costs of the distribution function. 95  In one estimate distribution costs were reported 
to account for 13% of multiple retailers’ total store operating costs at the start of the 1970s.96 
Contrasting philosophies existed among multiple grocers as to the economic benefits of centralised 
distribution versus direct to store deliveries during the early 1970s.97 Firms like Sainsbury’s and 
Safeway, then a UK subsidiary of the American Safeway Inc., operated highly centralised 
distribution, controlling a higher proportion of deliveries to branches in contrast to others including 
Fine Fare and Tesco. Yet a follow-up study on behalf of the Institute of Grocery Distribution in the 
mid-1980s would reveal a transformation of the situation that had resulted from the major multiples 
increasing their exercise of control over the supply chain.98 It was estimated that in the mid-1960s 
70% of distribution in the country was run by suppliers’ own account operations. At the end of the 
study period in the mid-1980s retailers controlled as much as 80% of the overall movement of goods 
to store.99  
Tesco represents an important example of the move toward centralisation of control of the distribution 
function, and the resulting constraints placed on individual store manager’s decision-making 
autonomy. Tesco invested substantially in upgrading its central buying and logistics capabilities and 
systems,100 and extended its direct control of replenishment into more complex categories, such as 
frozen foods, that were hitherto more associated with direct to store delivery.101 Investment in new 
computer systems at Head Office and subsequently in stores was intended to control costs and to 
enhance information flows to support decision-making.102 Tesco’s transformation of the management 
of its distribution system resulted in more efficient branch stock replenishment, significantly reducing 
the firm’s stock days and enabling it to better control the range and quality of its offer.103  
 
5.2 Corporate Culture and Approaches to Decision-Making 
Whilst varying market conditions provide some explanation for changes in management control of 
decision-making it is also clear that we need to look to internal firm dynamics. Cultural interpretations 
of organisational change offer potential in this context.104 Notable for its persistence, and hence 
resistance to change,105 Schwartz and Davis define corporate culture as “a pattern of beliefs and 
expectations shared by the organization's members. These beliefs and expectations produce norms 
that powerfully shape the behavior of individuals and groups in the organization.”106 As a starting 
point the discussion below focuses upon how the founders and senior managers of J. Sainsbury and 
Tesco perceived and influenced corporate culture. This is not to deny that organisations often have 
multiple, complementary or conflicting cultures that may variously support or act against its interests 
as they are perceived by senior management. Indeed this point is illustrated in part by some of the 
empirical case material presented above. Nor does it suggest that either business was disengaged from 
the increasingly rich external flows of information about supermarket operations and their 
management. Such information flows took on an increasingly international dimension and were of 
some importance in guiding the development of British supermarket retailing.107 For example, John 
Davan Sainsbury fostered close ties in the United States including with members of the Supermarket 
Institute of America, identifying the benefits these ties provided for the development of the firm’s 
management processes, particularly around the integration of new technologies.108 Experience of 
supermarket trading in international markets in which the format was more mature represented no 
panacea to the challenges that might be encountered in the British market however, as the example of 
the Fine Fare chain in the introduction reveals.109  
Available evidence suggests that differing organisational cultures at Tesco and J. Sainsbury were 
influenced by differing perspectives between the firms as to the desired locus of management 
decision-making. At J. Sainsbury senior management promoted a culture of centralisation of authority 
and control articulated through a clear management hierarchy, with detailed control emanating from a 
succession of chairmen and directors appointed from within the founding family.110 For example, 
David Clapham recalled of John Davan Sainsbury’s chairmanship of the firm: “I think the – the style 
throughout the whole company was set by JD. So the over-riding power and cultural development was 
the family and JD. No doubt about that. …the umbrella was the traditions of the company and the way 
JD wanted it.”111 The centralised and hierarchical approach to all management decision-making 
informed the approach to managing the stores. Delegates at the firm’s store managers’ conference of 
1978 were instructed that the nature of store retail management still very much revolved around the 
effective carrying out of central policies, procedures and instructions. “A JS manager has many 
resources at his disposal and no shortage of directives from the centre telling him what to do and how 
to do it. Perhaps he gets too many directives when guidance would be more desirable, but many of the 
most successful retail businesses have been built up, and still owe their current prosperity, to a high 
degree of centralised direction.”112   
The situation at Tesco reveals the significant influence of its founder, Jack Cohen, on the corporate 
culture of the business. But in this case it resulted in a very different outcome, until at least the second 
half of the 1970s. Cohen was Chairman of the board throughout the early post-war decades until being 
succeeded and being made Life President in 1970. He had a strong influence on the culture of the 
firm, and perhaps more particularly at lower management levels. Powell remarked of the period up to 
1979, “…the management structure still bore the impress of Jack Cohen. Entrenched at the branch 
level, and reified by tradition, his penchant for bottom-up management had once served well 
enough….”113 Mike Darnell who joined the Board in 1975 reflected: “Most managers had a cave-age 
mentality. They had their own little cave where they could tuck themselves away and make their own 
little decisions, careless of their impact on the company as a whole.”114 For Ian (now Lord) 
MacLaurin, who first joined the board in 1971, “To rationalise it was essential to centralise, a notion 
that was totally foreign to most of our managers, who had modelled themselves on Jack Cohen. 
…they’d learned their business in a different school, without any discipline.”115  
Cohen had sought to maintain his and the family’s control over Tesco, but others in senior 
management increasingly questioned and challenged the way he continued to run the business; a way 
that they considered bore similarities to his days as a market trader and with practices that they 
thought outdated and inappropriate for a major supermarket retailer.116 Only after the success of 
Operation Checkout was the challenge that Cohen’s approach represented to the agenda of the 
modernisers finally seen off.117 
 
7. Conclusion.  
By focusing on issues of management decision-making authority and responsibility the paper 
contributes to knowledge of the historical development of supermarket retailing in Britain. As such it 
complements earlier analyses that focused particularly on spatial and structural elements of 
development, and on the supermarkets’ impact in changing consumer culture.  
In particular, it informs understanding of differing approaches to management decision-making 
related to the stocking and merchandising of the store, both between firms and over time. First, it 
identifies competing approaches to the control of management decision-making on these matters. 
Some supermarket retailers adopted a strictly centralised control of management decision-making. 
Store managers in large part executed decisions issued from the centre, with little authority or 
opportunity to make local adaptations. Others operated in a manner that resulted in a more 
decentralised approach to management decision-making on these matters, with store managers 
exercising authority and responsibility at the local level. This could sometimes be at the expense of 
chain wide efficiencies. Variations in management decision-making control reflected the contrasting 
positions between firms as to how best to manage the operations of the new supermarket format, and 
resulted in investment in the development of differing capabilities.  
Using detailed historical analysis to understand how and why supermarket chains operating similar 
business models differed in their approach to the management of decision-making control can help to 
build upon our understanding of the patterns of change identified in retrospective analyses. It can help 
to remind us of the existence of alternatives, both potential and those that are realised, such as those 
addressed here in the comparative analysis of approaches to management decision-making control 
between J. Sainsbury and Tesco. It can also help us to explore the chronologies of choice and contest 
remarked upon above in the discussion of Operation Checkout and reactions to this. As such it can 
help us to better evaluate the explanatory power of process in strategy formulation.118 
Toward the end of the study period a growing uniformity of approach to management control had 
begun to appear across the grocery sector in Britain. This favoured a chain-oriented approach to 
decision-making based upon only ‘Partial and Limited’ decentralisation of management authority to 
the store level. In other words, a new sector recipe was identified. 119  Changes in the market 
environment are clearly very relevant in explaining the growing uniformity; not least with regard to 
changing consumer attitudes and behaviours on the demand-side, and the enhanced availability of 
information and communication technologies on the supply-side. Also, as more firms adopted an 
increasingly centralised approach to decision-making so others felt compelled to follow. Yet, the 
particular characteristics of firms’ responses can only be more fully understood if complemented by 
an exploration of the culture of the firm. Whilst such explorations present clear methodological 
challenges they offer a potentially rich dividend in this context. 
The importance of adopting an appropriate degree of decentralisation of decision-making control in 
retailing remains, and the discussion developed here is relevant to analyses of contemporary retailing 
and distribution.120 This is particularly so in exploring retailers’ internationalisation into emerging 
retail economies in which they commonly encounter markets that are fragmented and heterogeneous. 
Whilst many large-scale food retailers have sought to essentially replicate their approach from the 
home market when internationalising, this market fragmentation and heterogeneity has provided 
additional challenges. In the case of China, for example, internationalising retailers found these 
conditions to be especially pronounced in the fresh food categories with implications for management 
control and decision-making.121   
In relation to further business history research on this theme, there is both a need and an opportunity 
to more fully synthesise contemporary debates on the evolving nature of retail work with historical 
analyses of change in the sector. Some management and organisational studies theorists have 
suggested that the falling costs of communication associated with information technology have 
resulted in more empowerment of decentralised management in recent decades.122 This study does not 
point to any significant empowering effect for store managers of the introduction of the first wave of 
store-based information technologies. Rather its findings are more akin to those of studies of the 
nature of work in contemporary British supermarket retailing, the results of which suggest 
supermarket managers’ work to be heavily prescribed by respective functional divisions at Head 
Office, and to be driven in large measure by senior management’s expectations of compliance.123  
Finally, in relation to further historical analysis of management decision-making control in the retail 
sector retail co-operatives and voluntary group chains warrant more detailed research. Their differing 
norms of organisation and governance provide another dimension to management decision-making 
control. As Wilson et al. observe in relation to the co-operative movement, ‘the ties and tensions 
between national and local incentives run throughout the history of the British co-operative movement 
and its central institutions.’124  Some work has begun to explore the implications of this for the 
historical planning and development of supermarket retailing by co-operative societies, but there is 
scope for wider analysis.125 Similarly, voluntary groups represent a potentially rewarding case for 
study. Their central offices were often quick to develop and promote management systems and 
technologies designed to enhance chain-like efficiencies and consistencies. However, in wholesaler-
owned groups these services were neither always accepted nor fully adopted by retail members. 
Further study of these differing business models will help understanding of the complexity of the 
retail sector, and also its rich potential to contribute to debate in business history on themes of 
strategy, structure and governance. 
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Figure 1. Decision-Making Approach and Chain-Level Capability Development of 
Expanding Chains in Heterogeneous Market Conditions126 
Source: adapted from Goldman and Alexander, 2007 
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